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Wyndham Hotels and Resorts, LLC (“Hotels and Resorts”), Wyndham Worldwide 
Corporation (“Wyndham Worldwide”), Wyndham Hotel Group, LLC (“Hotel Group”), and 
Wyndham Hotel Management, Inc. (“Hotel Management”) (collectively, “Wyndham” or 
“Defendants”) failed to implement reasonable data security measures to protect the payment card 
information of their customers.  As a result of Wyndham’s failures, cyber criminals were able to 
penetrate their network three times over a two-year period, steal the payment card information of 
hundreds of thousands of Wyndham customers, and place fraudulent charges on those 
customers’ accounts, generating more than $10.6 million in fraud loss.   
The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) brought this equitable action under Section 5 of 
the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, alleging that Wyndham engaged in deceptive and unfair practices 
relating to data security and seeking a permanent injunction to prevent further consumer injury 
from those practices. Wyndham now asks this Court to be the first to hold that the FTC lacks the 
authority under the FTC Act to protect consumers from this type of injury.  Motion to Dismiss by 
Defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, ECF No. 91-1 (“Wyndham Mot.”).  Wyndham’s 
arguments rest on a tortured reading of the statute and a rejection of seventy-five years of 
enforcement. 
The FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).  The 
FTC’s two-count complaint alleges that (1) Defendants engaged in “deceptive” practices by 
misrepresenting that they took “commercially reasonable efforts” to secure customers’ payment 
card data; and (2) Defendants’ engaged in “unfair” practices because their lax security measures 
failed to adequately protect this payment card data.  First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and 
Other Equitable Relief (“Complaint”) ¶¶ 44-49, ECF No. 28.  The Complaint pleads specific 
facts that, if proven, would establish that Wyndham is liable on both counts.  This should end the 




Wyndham abandons any pretense of meeting the 12(b)(6) standard in its motion to 
dismiss.  Instead, Wyndham recasts questions of fact as questions of law, and challenges the 
FTC’s long-established authority under the FTC Act to protect consumers’ data from identity 
theft and other harms as a result of unreasonable data security.  Defendants’ baseless legal 
challenge to the “unfairness” portion of the FTC Act inexplicably reads a data security exception 
into the statute, suggesting that the FTC can enforce the Act against unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices, but not against unfair practices relating to data security. 
Defendants also suggest that the FTC’s broad consumer protection mandate—which has 
been part of the FTC Act since 1914—is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide fair 
notice.  This premise undercuts the very purpose of this long-standing statute, which was 
designed to permit the FTC to protect consumers from unanticipated, unenumerated threats.  
Moreover, the FTC has prudently pursued its mandate to protect consumers from unfair data 
security, providing guidance to companies through public statements and nineteen separate 
enforcement actions on this issue.  Indeed, numerous courts have upheld federal agencies’ ability 
to seek equitable relief in court, based on violations of laws that provide far less guidance than 
the FTC Act and subsequent Commission enforcement actions have provided.  Wyndham’s 
arguments lack merit and should be rejected by the Court. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Wyndham’s motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  To survive such a motion, the plaintiff need only 
allege facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)).  Facial 
plausibility is established where the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 
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the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
at 678.  In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts 
“‘accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff 
may be entitled to relief.’”  Phillips v. Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 
Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)).  Under this standard, the 
Complaint states a claim for relief and Wyndham’s motion to dismiss must be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits unfair or deceptive practices.  The FTC pleads 
sufficient facts in the Complaint to state a plausible claim that Defendants engaged in unfair and 
deceptive practices as a result of their failure to maintain reasonable data security and their 
misrepresentations to consumers about the quality of their data security.   
I. THE COMPLAINT SATISFIES THE PLEADING STANDARD FOR UNFAIR 
ACTS OR PRACTICES. 
Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).  To state a claim for unfair practices under Section 5 of the 
FTC Act, the FTC must plead (1) that an act or practice caused or is likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers, (2) that the injury was not reasonably avoidable by consumers, and (3) that 
the injury was not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.  15 
U.S.C. § 45(n); FTC v. NHS Sys., Inc., No. 08-2215, 2013 WL 1285424, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 
2013).  “[T]he consumer injury test is the most precise definition of unfairness articulated by 
either the Commission or Congress.”  Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 972 (D.C. Cir. 
1985) (rejecting argument that “the FTC has no authority to proscribe the ‘kinds’ of practices or 
prevent the ‘kinds’ of consumer injury at issue in this case”). 
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Applying unfairness to data security practices, the FTC first pleads that Wyndham’s 
practices were unreasonable—that is, that there were no countervailing benefits to Wyndham’s 
failure to address its data security failures.  Second, the FTC pleads that substantial injury 
resulted from Wyndham’s unreasonable data security practices.  Third, the FTC pleads that this 
injury was not reasonably avoidable by consumers.  Finally, the FTC pleads that Wyndham’s 
unreasonable data security caused this substantial injury to consumers. 
A. The FTC Pleads All Elements of Section 5 Unfair Practices. 
Wyndham engaged in unreasonable data security practices.  Wyndham repeatedly and 
inaccurately claims that the FTC’s Complaint fails to provide any specificity about the nature of 
Wyndham’s data security failures.  Wyndham Mot. 4, 22, 27.  These claims are baseless.  In fact, 
the Complaint alleges with specificity that Wyndham:  failed to limit access among different 
computer networks through the use of readily available measures, such as firewalls (Compl. at 
¶ 24(a)); permitted improperly-configured software, resulting in the storage of payment card 
information in clear text (id. at ¶ 24(b)); failed to ensure the Wyndham-branded hotels had 
adequate information security policies in place prior to allowing them to access Wyndham’s 
computer network (id. at ¶ 24(c)); failed to require servers attached to its networks to have the 
latest security patches from manufacturers (id. at ¶ 24(d)); permitted servers on its network with 
commonly-known default user IDs and passwords (id. at ¶ 24(e)); failed to follow best practices 
for password complexity (id. at ¶ 24(f)); failed to inventory the computers on its network in order 
to permit Wyndham to identify the origin of intrusion efforts (id. at ¶ 24(g)); failed to employ 
reasonable measures to detect and prevent unauthorized access (id. at ¶ 24(h)); failed to follow 
proper procedures to prevent repeated intrusions (id. at ¶ 24(i)); and failed to restrict third-party 
access to its network (id. at ¶ 24(j)). 
Wyndham could have avoided or remedied these unreasonable data security practices 
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through readily available, low-cost measures.  Because there are few, if any, benefits to 
unreasonable data security practices, especially when the remedies are low- or no-cost, there are 
no countervailing benefits to Wyndham’s practices.1  Regardless, the existence of countervailing 
benefits of inadequate data security is a question of fact and inappropriate for a motion to 
dismiss.  See, e.g., NHS Sys., 2013 WL 1285424, at *6 (finding no countervailing benefits at 
summary judgment stage).   
Consumers were injured by Wyndham’s unfair data security practices.  The Complaint 
alleges that: 
Consumers and businesses suffered financial injury, including, but not limited to, 
unreimbursed fraudulent charges, increased costs, and lost access to funds or 
credit.  Consumers and businesses also expended time and money resolving 
fraudulent charges and mitigating subsequent harm. 
Compl. ¶ 40.  Accepting these well-pleaded allegations as true, and in a light most favorable to 
the Plaintiff, the FTC alleges consumer injury sufficient to support a claim of unfairness.  As 
discussed further below, Wyndham’s contention that consumers were not actually injured in 
these ways is a classic factual dispute, and not a proper inquiry for a motion to dismiss. 
The injury was not reasonably avoidable.  The Complaint alleges injury that consumers 
could not have reasonably avoided.  Compl. ¶ 40; id. ¶ 48.  Consumers could not take steps to 
avoid Wyndham’s unreasonable data security because Wyndham falsely told consumers that it 
followed “industry standard practices.”  Compl. ¶ 21.  Consumers also could not avoid the 
injuries resulting from Wyndham’s unreasonable data security, including:  Lack of access to 
credit resulting from frozen credit cards; lack of access to funds from frozen debit cards; costs 
associated with switching payment cards; and “time and money resolving fraudulent charges and 
                                                 
1  Wyndham offers a different version of this analysis, arguing that the “standard of liability for 
failing to adequately protect [payment card] data” should be “high” because the risk of consumer 
injury is low.  Wyndham Mot. 22.  This misapprehends the pertinent balancing test, which 
weighs the risks of the practice against the benefits of the practice.  15 U.S.C. § 45(n). 
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mitigating subsequent harm.”  Compl. ¶ 40.  Finally, and as discussed further below, Wyndham’s 
belief that consumers can reasonably avoid payment card fraud is very much a disputed claim, 
and therefore not appropriate for a motion to dismiss.  FTC v. Inc21.com Corp., 745 F. Supp. 2d 
975, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (finding, in telephone billing context, that “the FTC has met its 
burden of proving that these unauthorized charges were not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers.”).  See also id. (“This order declines to allow defendants to blame unsuspecting 
consumers for failing to detect and dispute unauthorized billing activity.”). 
Wyndham’s unreasonable data security caused this substantial injury.  Wyndham 
makes the astonishing claim that the Complaint does not plead causation.  Wyndham Mot. 23.  In 
order to make this argument, Wyndham willfully ignores the extensive description of how 
hackers were able to exploit specific failures of Wyndham’s data security program in order to 
retrieve consumers’ personal information.  Compl. ¶¶ 24-39.  For example, the Complaint alleges 
that Wyndham “failed to adequately inventory computers connected to the Hotels and Resorts’ 
network so that Defendants could appropriately manage the devices on its network.”  Compl. 
¶ 24(g).  In the description of the first breach, the Complaint alleges that Wyndham was unable 
to determine that the account lockouts resulting from a brute force attack were coming from two 
computers on Hotels and Resorts’ network because they “did not have an adequate inventory of 
the Wyndham-branded hotels’ computers.”  Id. ¶ 27.  In addition, the Complaint states a 
plausible claim that these breaches resulted in the injury pleaded above, given that these were the 
same payment cards that are alleged to have been used for at least $10.6 million in fraudulent 
charges.  Id. ¶ 40.  The Complaint sufficiently alleges that Wyndham’s unreasonable data 
security practices cause these consumer injuries. 
B. Wyndham’s Remaining Injury Arguments Are Questions of Fact. 
Wyndham and its amici raise numerous fact issues to argue that payment card fraud does 
Case 2:13-cv-01887-ES-SCM   Document 110   Filed 05/20/13   Page 12 of 36 PageID: 1158
7 
 
not rise to the level of injury necessary to satisfy the FTC Act.  These arguments are an attempt 
by Wyndham to mischaracterize questions of fact as questions of law.  As noted above, questions 
of how much time and money consumers lost, whether they were able to get reimbursed, and 
whether they could have reasonably avoided injury are all questions of fact to be decided at trial. 
Wyndham’s reliance on Reilly v. Ceridian, 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011), in this regard is 
misplaced.  In fact, Reilly and other recent Article III standing cases squarely support the FTC’s 
injury argument in this matter.  In Reilly, the Third Circuit found that plaintiffs did not suffer 
injury sufficient to confer standing in a case where their personal information was stolen, 
because “no misuse [was] alleged.”  Id. at 45.  The Court suggested that if there had been any 
misuse, then there would be injury: 
Although Appellants have incurred expenses to monitor their accounts and “to 
protect their personal and financial information from imminent misuse and/or 
identity theft,” App. 00021, they have not done so as a result of any actual injury 
(e.g. because their private information was misused or their identities stolen). 
Rather, they prophylactically spent money to ease fears of future third-party 
criminality. Such misuse is only speculative—not imminent. The claim that they 
incurred expenses in anticipation of future harm, therefore, is not sufficient to 
confer standing. 
Id. at 46 (emphasis in original).  This approach was ratified by the Supreme Court in Clapper v. 
Amnesty International, which noted that plaintiffs’ “costly and burdensome” mitigation efforts 
are “fairly traceable” to the practice only if the anticipated injury is “certainly impending.”  133 
S. Ct. 1138, 1151 (2013).  The clear implication of both Reilly and Clapper is that if misuse has 
occurred, as it has here, then mitigation efforts to prevent further harm constitute fairly traceable 
injury sufficient for Article III standing. 
The First Circuit in Anderson v. Hannaford Brothers Co. holds expressly what Reilly and 
Clapper hold by implication.  659 F.3d 151, 164-65 (1st Cir. 2011).  In Hannaford, the First 
Circuit found that plaintiffs’ mitigation efforts to avoid credit card fraud were reasonable and 
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recoverable because there were fraudulent charges on their payment cards (even if reimbursed).  
Id.  The court distinguished from cases where no unauthorized charges were made: 
These courts reasoned that in the absence of unauthorized charges as to the 
plaintiffs or those similarly situated, the plaintiffs there lacked a reasonable basis 
for fearing there would be unauthorized charges to their accounts as a result of the 
theft. That very reasoning suggests that these courts would reach a different result 
if the plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered fraudulent charges to their accounts. 
Id. at 166.  Furthermore, the Court explicitly rejected Hannaford’s argument that the alleged 
“zero-liability” policies of the credit card companies is relevant to injury, especially at the 
motion to dismiss stage.  Id. at 164 n.8. 
In any event, Wyndham’s (and its amici’s) arguments fundamentally misrepresent the 
nature of consumer injuries when their payment card information is stolen.  First, Wyndham’s 
argument that consumers did not suffer injury because of caps on liability is quite dubious, if not 
flatly wrong.  See Bureau of Justice Statistics, Victims of Identity Theft, 2008 (December 2010) 
(stating that 14% of victims of credit fraud suffered out-of-pocket financial loss and, of those, 
victims suffered an average loss of $988”), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vit08.pdf.  
Second, federal law does not provide these same liability protections for debit cards.  12 C.F.R. § 
205.6(b)(1)-(3) (2013) (establishing three tiers of potential liability, the last of which is unlimited 
liability).  Third, Wyndham assumes that all fraudulent charges were reimbursed, which is a 
question of fact. 
Finally, the FTC’s well-pleaded claims allege injury other than unreimbursed fraud 
charges (Compl. ¶ 40), all of which are cognizable under the FTC Act.  See FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 
604 F.3d 1150, 1158 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[O]btaining reimbursement required a substantial 
investment of time, trouble, aggravation, and money. . . . Regardless of whether a bank 
eventually restored consumers’ money, the consumer suffered unavoidable injuries that could not 
be fully mitigated.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 
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1194 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding substantial injury from “emotional harm” and “costs in changing 
telephone providers”).  And, in any event, the test is not substantial injury to any one consumer.  
As courts have noted, “An injury may be sufficiently substantial . . . if it does a small harm to a 
large number of people, or if it raises a significant risk of concrete harm.”  Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n, 
767 F.2d at 972 (quotation marks and citation omitted).  See also Orkin Exterminating Co. v. 
FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1365 (11th Cir. 1988) (“As the Commission noted, although the actual 
injury to individual customers may be small on an annual basis, this does not mean that such 
injury is not ‘substantial.’” (citation omitted)). 
Wyndham compares itself to a “local furniture store” that was robbed, and protests that 
the FTC is re-victimizing it with this suit.  Wyndham Mot. 21.  A more accurate analogy would 
be that Wyndham was a local furniture store that left copies of its customers’ credit and debit 
card information lying on the counter, failed to lock the doors of the store at night, and was 
shocked to find in the morning that someone had stolen the information.  Unlike Wyndham’s 
hypothetical furniture heist, Wyndham’s role in this matter was primarily as a vehicle for the 
victimization of consumers.  The FTC is not suing Wyndham for the fact that it was hacked, it is 
suing Wyndham for mishandling consumers’ information such that hackers were able to steal it. 
II. THE FTC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE THE FTC ACT AGAINST 
ENTITIES FOR UNFAIR PRACTICES RELATED TO DATA SECURITY. 
As explained above in Part I, the Complaint satisfies the pleading standard for unfair 
practices.  This should end the inquiry.  Nonetheless, Wyndham navigates its motion into 
uncharted territory, arguing that this Court should carve out a data security exception to the 
FTC’s well-established unfairness authority.  Moreover, Wyndham claims that it lacked fair 
notice of the FTC’s enforcement authority in this area, notwithstanding the abundance of 
governmental and non-governmental guidance about what constitutes reasonable data security. 
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A. Section 5 of the FTC Act Grants the FTC Authority Over Data Security. 
Wyndham claims that applying unfairness to data security practices would be 
inconsistent with the statutory scheme.  Wyndham Mot. 7-14.  Wyndham does not dispute, 
however, that Section 5’s prohibition of “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce” should cover deceptive data security practices.  Wyndham Mot. 2 (“[Hotels and 
Resorts] does not dispute that the FTC can bring enforcement actions against companies that 
make ‘deceptive’ statements to consumers.”).  Instead, Wyndham argues that this Court should 
read a limited, implicit exemption for data security into the middle of the words “unfair” and 
“deceptive,” based on the Supreme Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
Wyndham’s reliance on Brown & Williamson is misplaced.  In Brown & Williamson, the 
Supreme Court reversed the FDA’s assertion of authority over tobacco due to “extraordinary” 
circumstances:  The FDA for decades had denied that it had such authority, and its assertion of 
the authority would result in statutory inconsistencies.  529 U.S. at 159; id. at 137.  Neither of 
these factors is present here.  Indeed, Wyndham contends that the circumstances here only 
“strongly suggest” that unfairness should not cover data security.  Wyndham Mot. 8.  Even if 
there were such a “strong suggestion”—which there is not—the facts here would fall well short 
of the “extraordinary” circumstances that led the Court to overturn the FDA’s assertion of 
authority over tobacco.  Id. at 159-60. 
1. Data Security Statutes Do Not Limit FTC Authority Under the FTC Act. 
First, Wyndham incorrectly argues that several statutes that provide the FTC with legal 
tools to address data security in specific contexts somehow “preclude” or “foreclose” an 
interpretation of the FTC Act to cover unfair and deceptive acts or practices related to data 
security.  Wyndham Mot. 7-8.  But Wyndham has not argued (nor could it) that there is a 
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contradiction that requires this Court to reconcile the FTC Act with complementary data security 
statutes.  Cf. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 139 (finding FDA’s interpretation to “plainly 
contradict congressional policy”).   
Congress deliberately delegated broad power to the FTC under Section 5 of the FTC Act 
to address unanticipated practices in a changing economy.  See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 
405 U.S. 233, 240 (1972) (“Congress . . . explicitly considered, and rejected, the notion that it 
reduce the ambiguity of the phrase ‘unfair methods of competition’ by tying the concept of 
unfairness to a common-law or statutory standard or by enumerating the particular practices to 
which it was intended to apply.”).  The legislative history of the FTC Act reflects Congress’s 
concerns about attempting to enumerate specific acts and practices.  See S. Rep. No. 63-597, at 
13 (1914) (“there were too many unfair practices to define, and after writing 20 of them into the 
law it would be quite possible to invent others”); H.R. Rep. No. 63-1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. 
Rep.) (“It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices.”).  Indeed, the 
statute also does not mention any of the established uses of its unfairness provision, including 
online check drafting and delivery (see Neovi, 604 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2010); sale of telephone 
records (see Accusearch, 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009)); unilateral breach of contracts (see 
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354 (11th Cir. 1988)); telephone billing practices 
(see FTC v. Verity Int’l, 335 F. Supp. 2d 479, 498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)); unsafe farm equipment 
(see In the Matter of Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984)); or many other practices 
affecting commerce, all of which courts routinely find to be subject to Section 5 of the FTC Act.  
The FTC’s determination to enforce the FTC Act in these contexts—as well as in the data 
security context—is entitled to deference.  See Arlington v. FCC, Nos. 11-1545, 11-1547, 2013 
WL 2149789, slip op. at *16-17 (May 20, 2013). 
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The subsequent enactment of sector-specific laws to enhance regulatory authority over 
data security in particular industries neither contradicts nor is inconsistent with Congress’s grant 
of broad authority to the FTC to prohibit deceptive and unfair practices that injure consumers.  
Instead, the sector-specific laws enhance FTC authority with new legal tools.  For example, 
Congress provided the FTC with rulemaking and/or civil penalty authority through the enactment 
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLB”), and Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”).  Similarly, the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) and the Health Information Technology for Economic 
and Clinical Health Act (“HITECH Act”) give the Department of Health and Human Services 
rulemaking and civil penalty authority.  By contrast, the FTC is not seeking civil penalties in this 
matter; rather, the FTC is seeking only equitable relief.  See Prayer for Relief, Compl. 
These statutes and the FTC Act co-exist without contradiction or inconsistency.  They are 
complementary, and by no means irreconcilable.  Cf. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143 
(undertaking the “task of reconciling many laws enacted over time, and getting them to ‘make 
sense’ in combination.” (citing United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988))).   
Lastly, Wyndham does not, and cannot, argue that the scope of the FTC Act has been 
impliedly repealed.  The courts will not infer a statutory repeal “unless the later statute ‘expressly 
contradict[s] the original act’” or unless such a construction “is absolutely necessary ... in order 
that [the] words [of the later statute] shall have any meaning at all.”  See Nat’l Ass’n of Home 
Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 662-63 (2007).  Wyndham has not met this 
standard.2 
                                                 
2 Wyndham argues that because the FTC has sought additional data security legislation from 
Congress, it necessarily lacks authority under Section 5 to challenge data security practices as 
unfair.  See Wyndham Mot. 11.  Wyndham fails to appreciate that the FTC has sought legislation 
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2. The FTC Has Always Affirmed, and Never Disavowed, Authority Over 
Unfair Practices Related to Data Security. 
Second, Wyndham argues that the FTC originally disclaimed authority to pursue unfair 
practices related to data security and that its position in this matter is a “quite recent[]” reversal.  
Wyndham Mot. 10-11.  These claims are contrary to fact:  Since 2000, the FTC has brought 
more than forty data security cases, nineteen of which alleged unfair practices.  See Legal 
Resources | BCP Business Center, http://business.ftc.gov/legal-resources/29/35.  The FTC has 
routinely reported and publicized its data security program, including these enforcement 
activities, to Congress, consumers, and industry.  See, e.g., Identity Theft: Innovative Solutions 
for an Evolving Problem:  Hearing before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology, and 
Homeland Security of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. at 5-6 (March 21, 2007) 
(Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission) (“[I]n several of the cases, the alleged 
security inadequacies led to breaches that caused substantial consumer injury and were 
challenged as unfair practices under the FTC Act.”).3 
Wyndham incorrectly asserts that the FTC disclaimed its authority in 2000 when it stated 
that it “lacks authority to require firms to adopt information practice policies.”  Wyndham Mot. 
10 (quoting Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices In The 
Electronic Marketplace at 33-34 (May 2000) available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf (“Privacy Report”)).  Wyndham mischaracterizes the Privacy 
Report, which states only that FTC Act authority under Section 5 is limited to unfair or deceptive 
                                                                                                                                                             
to provide additional tools, such as civil penalties, to complement the authority it already has 
under Section 5. 
3  The FTC has reported to Congress more than thirty times since 2003 on its Section 5 
enforcement activities related to data security.  In at least a dozen instances, it has specifically 
stated that failure to maintain reasonable security is an unfair practice.  See, e.g., Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (March 21, 2007) (Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade 
Commission). 
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practices, and thus would not encompass failure to adopt certain policies absent unfair or 
deceptive practices.  Id.  The same Privacy Report explicitly states, in a section titled “Current 
FTC Authority,” that “[t]he FTC Act prohibits unfair and deceptive practices in and affecting 
commerce.  It authorizes the Commission to seek injunctive and other equitable relief, including 
redress, for violations of the Act, and provides a basis for government enforcement of certain fair 
information practices.”  Id. 
Wyndham also selectively quotes former FTC Chairman Pitofsky’s 1998 testimony, 
omitting the fact that his testimony was expressly about online privacy, and not data security:  “I 
appreciate this opportunity to present the Commission’s recommendations for addressing the 
privacy concerns raised by the wide-spread collection of personal information from consumers 
by commercial sites on the World Wide Web.”  Consumer Privacy on the World Wide Web, 
Hearing Before Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on 
Commerce, 105th Cong. (July 21, 1998).  Chairman Pitofsky described the problem of the 
widespread and rampant collection of information online, which, given technology and business 
practices at the time, had not risen to the level of “injury” necessary to invoke unfairness.  
Directly addressing that issue, he stated that the FTC is “limited in this context to ensuring that 
Web sites follow their stated information practices.”  Id. (emphasis added).  See also Wyndham 
Mot. 10 (excising “in this context” from quote). 
Finally, the testimony by former Bureau Director Vladeck does not disclaim authority, as 
Wyndham claims.  Wyndham Mot. 11.  Indeed, it showcases the authority:   
In addition, the Commission enforces the FTC Act’s proscription against unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in cases where a business makes false or misleading 
claims about its data security procedures, or where its failure to employ 
reasonable security measures causes or is likely to cause substantial consumer 
injury. 
The Threat of Data Theft to American Consumers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, 
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Manufacturing, and Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 2 (May 4, 
2011) (emphasis added).  Bureau Director Vladeck immediately followed this comment with a 
description of two cases, both of which alleged unfair data security practices.  Id. at 2-4 
(describing In the Matter of Lookout Services, Inc., File No. 102 3076 (June 15, 2011); and In the 
Matter of Ceridian Corp., FTC File No. 102 3160 (June 8, 2011). 
Lastly, even if the FTC had originally disavowed its authority, which it did not, that fact 
would not be controlling.  See Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (“[T]he mere fact 
that an agency interpretation contradicts a prior agency position is not fatal.”).  Unlike Brown & 
Williamson, where the FDA had a 70-plus year history of disavowing its authority (529 U.S. at 
159), here Wyndham only can point to a few isolated statements, which it misinterprets, to claim 
disavowal. 
3. Legislative and Executive Interest in Data Security Neither Impliedly 
Nor Explicitly Deprives the FTC of its FTC Act Authority over Unfair 
and Deceptive Data Security Practices. 
Finally, Wyndham suggests that unenacted legislation, an executive order, and the 
“intense debate among members of Congress” somehow operate by inference to strip the FTC of 
its established authority over unfair practices pursuant to the FTC Act.  Wyndham Mot. 12-13.  
Wyndham argues that congressional interest in data security, and its failed efforts to pass specific 
data security legislation, create the presumption that “‘Congress could not have intended to 
delegate’” data security authority to the FTC under the FTC Act.  Wyndham Mot. 13 (quoting 
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160).  This argument is contrary to fact and precedent. 
If relevant at all, the facts of the congressional debate over data security affirm FTC 
authority over unfair practices related to data security.  For example, of the six data security bills 
Wyndham cites in support of its argument, four included savings clauses to preserve the FTC’s 
existing data security authority.  See S. 1207, 112th Cong. § 6(d) (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 2577, 
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112 Cong. § 6(d) (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 1841, 112 Cong. § 6(d) (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 1707, 112 
Cong. § 6(d) (1st Sess. 2011).4  Preservation clauses would be unnecessary if the FTC lacked any 
existing authority.  Similarly, Senator Rockefeller, who co-sponsored Senate Bill 1207, asked an 
FTC representative:  “Can you talk about how Senator Pryor’s and my bill will complement your 
existing enforcement efforts?”  Privacy and Data Security:  Protecting Consumers in the 
Modern World:  Hearing on S.B. 1207 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, 112th Cong. 32 (June 29, 2011) (emphasis added).  Thus there is no support for 
Wyndham’s argument that Congress is implying that it believes the FTC lacks authority. 
Similarly, the Obama Administration’s recent Executive Order on Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity in no way precludes FTC authority over unfair data security 
practices.  See Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11739 (Feb. 12, 2013) (“Executive Order”) 
(Hradil Decl., Ex. B).  The Executive Order neither addresses FTC authority nor addresses 
threats to anything other than “Critical Infrastructure,” which is defined as “systems and assets, 
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such 
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”  Executive Order § 2.  In 
contrast, this case addresses the protection of consumers’ payment card data and seeks to protect 
consumers’—rather than national security—interests. 
Finally, Wyndham’s assertion that there is a public controversy regarding the regulation 
of data security actually supports the FTC’s interpretation of the scope of the FTC Act:  
“[D]eference is particularly appropriate where, as here, an agency’s interpretation involves issues 
                                                 
4  Wyndham’s suggestion that the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act “would grant 
immunity” against any action for participating businesses is a gross misreading of the liability 
exemption provision.  H.R. 624, 113th Cong. § 3(b)(3)(A) (1st Sess. 2013).  The liability 
exemption provision is expressly limited to potential liability from complying with that Act.  Id. 
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of considerable public controversy, and Congress has not acted to correct any misperception of 
its statutory objectives.”  United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 554 (1979) (citations 
omitted).  Deference also is appropriate where, as here, Congress, after being informed of the 
agency’s interpretation, has amended a statute (e.g., U.S. SAFE WEB Act of 2006, PL 109–455, 
December 22, 2006, 120 Stat. 3372 (2006)), but not taken any steps to limit the contested 
interpretation.  See Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974) (“This longstanding administrative 
construction is entitled to great weight, particularly when, as here, congress has revisited the Act 
and left the practice untouched.”); Bunker Hill Co. v. EPA, 658 F.2d 1280, 1284 n.2 (9th Cir. 
1981) (“[A]n administrative interpretation deserves particular deference where Congress fails to 
take advantage of an opportunity to alter it.” (citations omitted)).  Congress’s inaction regarding 
the FTC’s longstanding and widely-reported authority over unfair practices related to data 
security confirms the FTC’s position in this litigation.   
B. Wyndham Has Fair Notice of What Section 5 Requires. 
Wyndham next argues that enforcement of the FTC Act is unconstitutional because 
“Section 5 itself clearly provides no meaningful notice to regulated parties—it generically 
prohibits ‘unfair and deceptive’ business practices without going into any further details as to 
what practices might be deemed ‘unfair’ or ‘deceptive.’”  Wyndham Mot. 17.  This extraordinary 
argument lacks merit.  As noted above, the FTC has consistently stated that in the context of data 
security, reasonableness is the touchstone:  unreasonable data security practices are unfair.  
Wyndham has notice of what it means to have reasonable data security, from both government 
and industry sources.  It is precisely within the expertise of this Court to evaluate the 
reasonableness of Wyndham’s data security program in light of these various types of guidance. 
1. Industry Understands the Meaning of Reasonable Data Security. 
Wyndham is not operating in the guidance vacuum that it claims.  There are a number of 
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sources of industry guidance on this issue.  Indeed, numerous entities have long provided 
information concerning the various factors companies should consider in addressing data 
security.  See, e.g., NIST Special Publication 800-12, An Introduction to Computer Security: The 
NIST Handbook (Oct. 1995); Standards.org, http://www.standards.org/standards/listing/pci_dss 
(describing history of PCI DSS); 27000.org, http://www.27000.org/iso-27001.htm (describing 
history of ISO/IEC 27001 standard) and http://www.27000.org/iso-27002.htm (describing 
history of ISO/IEC 27002 standard).5   
Wyndham cannot and, likely, does not expect to persuade this Court that it simply did not 
know what it meant to have reasonable data security.  Wyndham itself told consumers that it 
used “industry standard practices” and that it took “commercially reasonable” efforts to create 
and maintain firewalls.  Compl. ¶ 21.  In its motion to dismiss, Wyndham twice states that, in 
fact, it did take substantial security measures:  “WHR at the time had substantial security 
measures in place to protect its network against being hacked.”  Wyndham Mot. 1.  See also 
Wyndham Mot. 2 (describing the breaches as having occurred “notwithstanding the substantial 
data-security efforts [Hotels and Resorts] undertook both before and after attacks”).  Wyndham’s 
claim of “substantial security measures” merely restates the question that the FTC’s Complaint 
puts before the Court—the reasonableness of Wyndham’s data security practices. 
2. The FTC Provides Notice to Industry Through Business Guidance and 
Enforcement Actions. 
The FTC provides guidance regarding reasonable data security through its public 
statements.  See, e.g., Protecting Personal Information:  A Guide for Business (2007), 
                                                 
5  Wyndham may argue that it did not know which standard it was supposed to follow.  This 
argument misses the point.  These standards provide guidance that a reasonable person would 
adapt to the particular needs of the business in question.  The purpose of trial is to determine 
whether Wyndham’s data security program was reasonable based on what was known at the 
time. 




business_0.pdf.  In addition, many of the allegations of Defendants’ specific failures, as appear 
in Paragraph 24 of the FTC’s Complaint, correlate to various features of unreasonable data 
security programs that have been identified in previous FTC enforcement actions.  See, e.g., In 
the Matter of BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., File No. 042 3160 (Sept. 20, 2005) (alleging failures 
related to:  encryption; passwords; detection; investigation); In the Matter of Superior Mortgage, 
Corp., File No. 052 3136 (Dec. 14, 2005) (passwords); In the Matter of DSW, Inc.,  File No. 052 
3096 (Mar. 7, 2006) (encryption; passwords; segmentation; detection); In the Matter of Nations 
Title Agency, Inc., File No. 052 3117 (June 19, 2006) (detection; incident response; 
investigation); In the Matter of CardSystems Solutions, Inc., File No. 052 3148 (Sept. 5, 2006) 
(passwords; segmentation; detection; investigation); In the Matter of Guidance Software, Inc., 
File No. 062 3057 (Mar. 30, 2007) (encryption; detection); United States v. ValueClick, No. Civ. 
08-01711 (C.D. Cal. Filed Mar. 17, 2008) (encryption); In the Matter of Life is Good, Inc., File 
No. 072 3046 (Apr. 16, 2008) (encryption; detection); In the Matter of The TJX Companies, Inc., 
File No. 072 3055 (July 29, 2008) (encryption; passwords; segmentation; detection; 
investigation); In the Matter of Reed Elsevier, Inc., File No. 052 3094 (July 29, 2008) 
(passwords). 
Although every situation is different, the consent orders in these matters provide industry, 
including Wyndham, with notice of different features of data security that must be evaluated in 
order to maintain a reasonable data security program.  As the Supreme Court recognized in 
General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, “[T]he rulings, interpretations and opinions of the Administrator 
under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a 
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for 
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guidance.”  429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (citation omitted). 
3. In the Data Security Context, Adjudication is Permitted and Effective. 
The FTC’s decision to enforce the FTC Act’s prohibition of unfair practices through 
individual enforcement action, or adjudication, rather than rulemaking “lies [within its] informed 
discretion.”  PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 732 (3d Cir. 1973) (“The courts have 
consistently held that where an agency, as in this case, is given an option to proceed by 
rulemaking or by individual adjudication the choice is one that lies in the informed discretion of 
the administrative agency.” (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947); NLRB v. 
Wyman Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 772 (1969))).  “If the agency affords the party a ‘full 
opportunity to be heard before the [agency] makes its determination’ [NLRB v. Bell Aerospace 
Co., 416 U.S. 267, 295 (1974)], we cannot second-guess the agency decision whether to interpret 
a standard by rulemaking or by adjudication. [Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203].”  Beazer E., Inc. v. 
EPA, 963 F.2d 603, 609-10 (3d Cir. 1992). 
Nor would it be practicable in the data security context to establish through rulemaking 
the highly particularized guidelines that Wyndham requests.  Wyndham Mot. 17 (seeking rules 
dictating, inter alia, “what software they must use, how they must deploy firewalls”).6  Certain 
fields are “so specialized and varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the 
boundaries of a general rule.”  Chenery, 332 U.S. at 203.  The measure of reasonable data 
security correlates to the sensitivity of the information collected, the amount of information 
collected, threats attendant to a particular network structure, the evolving field of commonly-
                                                 
6  Although the FTC has sought rulemaking authority in the field of data security, it has not done 
so in order to establish particularized technical standards.  Instead, the FTC has sought authority 
to establish rules that create procedural requirements, such as mandating periodic risk 
assessments, similar to the rules promulgated pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.  See 
Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. § 314.4 (2013). 
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targeted vulnerabilities, and many other factors.7  The Supreme Court articulated the importance 
of case-by-case adjudication in similar circumstances: 
[The National Labor Relations Board] is not precluded from announcing new 
principles in an adjudicative proceeding and that the choice between rulemaking 
and adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board’s discretion.  Although 
there may be situations where the Board’s reliance on adjudication would amount 
to an abuse of discretion or a violation of the Act, nothing in the present case 
would justify such a conclusion.  Indeed, there is ample indication that 
adjudication is especially appropriate in the instant context.  As the Court of 
Appeals noted, “(t)here must be tens of thousands of manufacturing, wholesale 
and retail units which employ buyers, and hundreds of thousands of the latter.” 
[Bell Aerospace v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485, 496 (2d Cir. 1973)].  Moreover, duties of 
buyers vary widely depending on the company or industry.  It is doubtful whether 
any generalized standard could be framed which would have more than marginal 
utility. 
Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 294 (permitting NLRB to evaluate the definition of “managerial 
employees” for the purpose of collective bargaining on a case-by-case basis). 
Even the amici in support of Wyndham have recognized the importance of this type of 
regulatory flexibility in the field of data security.  The Chamber, despite now imploring the 
Court to require “formal guidance” (Chamber Br. at 12), has in the past led the charge on Capitol 
Hill to prevent the adoption of specific regulatory requirements in this area.  See Ken Dilanian, 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce leads defeat of cyber-security bill, Los Angeles Times (Aug. 3, 
2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/03/nation/la-na-cyber-security-20120803 (“[T]he 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other business groups strenuously opposed the measure, 
                                                 
7  The United States Chamber of Commerce (“Chamber”) endeavors to flip on its head the 
reasoning of Chenery, and asserts that “it is precisely because the appropriate standards are 
difficult to ascertain that businesses cannot be held to a nebulous notion of ‘reasonableness,’ all 
without any formal guidance before they find themselves in violation of the law.”  Proposed 
Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, Retail Litigation 
Center, American Hotel & Lodging Association, and National Federal of Independent Business 
in Support of Defendants, ECF No. 95-2 (“Chamber Br.”) 12 (emphasis in original).  The 
Chamber offers no legal support for this argument, which contradicts the holding of Chenery that 
“specialized and varying” fields are best-suited to case-by-case adjudication.  Chenery Corp., 
332 U.S. at 203. 
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condemning it as excessive government interference in the free market and arguing that 
cumbersome federal regulations could hamper companies trying to defend against cyber 
intrusions.”).  In its statement discouraging passage of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, the 
Chamber discouraged any legislative efforts that would create explicit rules for businesses to 
follow:  “The Chamber urges Congress to not complicate or duplicate existing industry-driven 
security standards with government mandates and bureaucracies . . . .”  See U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, Key Vote letter on S. 3414, the “Cybersecurity Act of 2012” (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2012/key-vote-letter-s-3414-cybersecurity-act-2012.” 
The FTC’s Complaint aligns with the Chamber’s previously-advocated position that data 
security standards can be enforced in an industry-specific, case-by-case manner.8  This approach 
saves regulated entities, such as Wyndham, from having to comply unnecessarily with data 
security standards that may be excessive in light of the circumstances, and permits regulated 
entities an opportunity to represent to the finder of fact why it believes—as Wyndham apparently 
did—that its data security was reasonable. 
4. Courts Are Well Suited To Evaluate the Reasonableness of Wyndham’s 
Data Security Practices. 
When it passed the FTC Act, Congress observed that courts would have an important role 
to play in evaluating unfairness.  See FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 312 n.2 (1934) 
(“It is believed that the term ‘unfair competition’ has a legal significance which can be enforced 
by the commission and the courts, and that it is no more difficult to determine what is unfair 
                                                 
8  For its part, TechFreedom appears to argue even more explicitly for a judiciary-focused 
approach:  “Those aspects of data security that cannot easily be reduced to rules might well be 
more amenable to case-by-case adjudication.  But without Article III court decisions developing 
binding legal principles and no other meaningful form of guidance from the FTC, the law will 
remain unconstitutionally vague.”  Amici Curiae Brief of TechFreedom, International Center For 
Law and Economics & Consumer Protection Scholars, No. ECF 94-3 (“TechFreedom Br.”) 9.  
Although the FTC disputes that it has provided no meaningful guidance, it agrees that the field 
would be aided by a body of law that includes “Article III court decisions.” 
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competition than it is to determine what is a reasonable rate or what is an unjust discrimination.” 
(citing S. Rep. No. 597, at 13 (1914)).  It is precisely this role that this court will play in 
evaluating the reasonableness of Wyndham’s data security practices. 
Agencies routinely bring enforcement actions where the governing statute or rules lack 
particularized prohibitions.  For example, the National Labor Relations Board requires labor 
unions, among other things, to bargain on behalf of their employees “in good faith.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(d).  Courts subsequently have developed this language in a manner that is “consistent with 
the aim of the [National Labor Relations Act] to promote the resolution of conflict in the labor 
arena.”  NLRB v. New Assocs., 35 F.3d 828, 834 (3d Cir. 1994).  Similarly, the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act (OSHA) has a “General Duty Clause” that requires employees to furnish a 
workplace “free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious 
physical harm to his employees.”  29 U.S.C. § 654.  The Third Circuit has interpreted this 
obligation as invoking the reasonable person standard, informed in part by industry standards.  
Voegele Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 625 F.2d 1075, 1078 (3d 
Cir. 1980).  In fact, under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts routinely subject numerous 
agency actions to a similar reasonableness test.  5 U.S.C. § 706. 
Although Wyndham relies on several OSHA cases in its fair notice argument, it neglects 
discussion of the General Duty Clause, which is most analogous to the unfairness prohibition of 
the FTC Act.  For example, Wyndham cites Fabi Construction Co. v. Secretary of Labor for the 
proposition that Fabi lacked fair notice of OSHA regulations.  508 F.3d 1077, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 
2007).  This same case, however, includes an extensive reasonableness analysis to evaluate 
whether Fabi violated the General Duty Clause.  In its determination that Fabi did not meet this 
“general duty,” the Court evaluated a number of factors, including whether Fabi followed third-
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party technical drawings, whether Fabi complied with industry standard practices, and expert 
opinion on Fabi’s likely familiarity with industry standards.  Id. at 1084.  This is the type of 
inquiry the FTC asks this Court to undertake in this matter. 
Nor is there anything extraordinary about courts using these same tools to evaluate the 
reasonableness of data security.  See, e.g., United States v. Hanjuan Jin, 833 F. Supp. 2d 977, 
1008-09 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (evaluating, in trade secrets action, the reasonableness of Motorola’s 
data security, including password policies, firewalls, physical security, etc.).  There is simply no 
factual or legal basis for Wyndham and the amici’s position that this case is somehow unusual, 
much less that it is unconstitutional. 
5. Wyndham’s Fair Notice Cases Are Inapposite. 
Wyndham relies principally on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in FCC v. Fox 
Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012) (“Fox II”), to argue that, because the FTC is 
proceeding through case-by-case enforcement, the FTC Act should be invalidated and this case 
should be dismissed for lack of fair notice.  Wyndham Mot. 14-19.  This reliance is badly 
misplaced.  In Fox II, the FCC’s failure to provide notice had nothing to do with the FCC 
proceeding by case-by-case enforcement, as Wyndham suggests.  Instead, it was undisputed that 
the FCC had “reversed prior rulings that had found fleeting expletives not indecent.”  Id. at 2314.  
Indeed, in Fox I, the Supreme Court expressly affirmed the FCC’s authority to evaluate 
obscenity on a case-by-case basis:  “More fundamentally, however, the agency’s decision to 
consider the patent offensiveness of isolated expletives on a case-by-case basis is not arbitrary or 
capricious.”  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 520 (2009).  See also id. 
(recognizing that case-by-case enforcement is necessary to distinguish between obscene 
language uttered at awards shows, which “draw the attention of millions of children” versus, for 
example, a “recitation of Geoffrey Chaucer’s Miller’s Tale”). 
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Moreover, in this matter, the FTC is seeking only equitable relief, and doing so in a field 
that has been the subject of FTC enforcement activity since 2000.  By contrast, the cases that 
Wyndham relies on, including Fox II, expressly limit themselves to instances in which one or 
both of the following are true:  the agency had reversed itself, and the agency was seeking to 
impose punitive (as opposed to equitable) remedies.  See Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2314 (reversal of 
position); id. at 2318 (legal remedies); Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 
2156, 2169 (2012) (agency “advanced a different interpretation” previously); id. at 2167 
(interpretation threatened “massive liability”); General Electric Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1329-
30 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“an agency may not deprive a party of property by imposing civil or 
criminal liability”); Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 790 
F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (invalidating application of regulation appropriate “[w]here the 
imposition of penal sanctions is at issue”); Dravo Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 613 F.2d 1227, 1229 (3d Cir. 1980) (“reject[ing] the approach taken in another 
proceeding”); id. at 1232 (rejecting expansive interpretation because “we deal here with a penal 
sanction”); Fabi Construction, 508 F.3d at 1086 (agency “interpretation fails to make sense”); id. 
at 1089 (resulting in “citation and fine”); Trinity Broadcasting of Fla., Inc. v. FCC, 211 F.3d 
618, 631-32 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (company penalized by refusal to renew license after “problematic” 
interpretation that contradicted earlier interpretation); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 
1350, 1355-56 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (NHTSA’s interpretation contradicted its “own test schematic,” 
and would “deprive Chrysler of property no less than a fine”). 
This action falls within neither of those categories.  Here, the FTC is seeking to enforce 
Section 5 in the same way it has for the last decade.  Moreover, rather than seek civil penalties, 
the FTC here is pursuing only equitable relief.  Compl. ¶ 51.  Cf. FTC v. Magazine Solutions, 
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LLC, 432 F. App’x 155, 158 (3d Cir. 2011) (“[Section] 13(b)’s grant of authority to provide 
injunctive relief carries with it the full range of equitable remedies[.]” (quotation marks and 
citations omitted)).  
III. THE COMPLAINT SATISFIES THE PLEADING STANDARD FOR 
DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES. 
Finally, this Court should reject Wyndham’s half-hearted argument that the FTC fails to 
state a claim for deception.  Wyndham’s invocation of franchise law is, not only a red herring, 
but an argument that is highly fact-specific and not suitable for a motion to dismiss.9  Regardless, 
the Complaint carefully catalogs the various deceptive statements by each of the Wyndham 
entities.10 
A. The Complaint Need Not Meet the Rule 9(b) Standard. 
Wyndham cursorily asserts that deception “sounds in fraud” and therefore the Complaint 
must satisfy the Rule 9(b) pleading requirements for this count.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  This is a 
question of first impression in this district.  The Southern District of New York and several 
“[o]ther district courts have held that actions brought by the FTC for violations of Section 5(a) of 
the FTC Act are not subject to Rule 9(b).”  FTC v. Med. Billers Network, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 2d 
283, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (collecting cases).  Wyndham cites two district court cases from the 
Ninth Circuit.  FTC v. Lights of Am., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 848, 853 (C.D. Cal. 2010); FTC v. Ivy 
Capital, No. 2:11-CV-286, 2011 WL 2118626, at *3 (D. Nev. May 25, 2011) (following Lights 
of America).  This Court should not follow these cases, however, as they are wrongly decided. 
                                                 
9  The International Franchise Association brief suffers from the same defect.  Its argument is 
entirely dependent on the content of the franchise agreements.  Brief Amicus Curiae of the 
International Franchise Association in Support of Defendant Wyndham Hotels & Resorts’ 
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 96-2 (“IFA Br.”) 2-10. 
10  As explained further in the FTC’s Response in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss by 
Wyndham Worldwide, Hotel Group, and Hotel Management, filed simultaneously, the 
Complaint also pleads that all four Wyndham entities operate as a common enterprise. 
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As the Tenth Circuit has held, a claim of deceptive practices pursuant to Section 5 of the 
FTC Act “is not a claim of fraud as that term is commonly understood or as contemplated by 
Rule 9(b).”  FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1203 n.7 (10th Cir. 2005).  
Moreover, unlike an action for common law fraud, the Commission does not need to prove 
scienter, reliance, or injury to establish deception under the FTC Act.  Id.  See also FTC v. 
Publ’g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he FTC is not required to 
show that a defendant intended to defraud consumers . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); FTC v. Figgie 
Int’l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1993) (unlike common law fraud, proof of subjective 
reliance by individual consumers is not required in FTC enforcement actions).  Therefore, Rule 
9(b) should not apply. 
B. Regardless, the Complaint Meets the Rule 9(b) Standard. 
Even if Rule 9(b) were applicable here, the Complaint satisfies it because “the 
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake” are stated “with particularity.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  
The FTC “plead[s] with particularity the ‘circumstances’ of the alleged fraud in order to place 
the defendants on notice of the precise misconduct with which they are charged.”  Seville Indus. 
Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1984); see also In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1418 (3d Cir. 1997) (same). 
Wyndham claims that “the FTC relies primarily on allegations concerning the state of 
data-security at the Wyndham-branded hotels.”  Wyndham Mot. 24 (emphasis in original).  This 
inaccurately characterizes the allegations in Paragraph 24 of the Complaint.  In fact, the 
Complaint alleges that Wyndham was responsible for these failures because it permitted 
computers with unreasonable data security measures on its network.  Compl. ¶ 24.  Thus, for 
example, the allegation that Wyndham “failed to ensure the Wyndham-branded hotels 
implemented adequate information security policies and procedures prior to connecting their 
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local computer networks to Hotels and Resorts’ computer network” (id. ¶ 24(c)), reflects both a 
failure of the Wyndham-branded hotels (for failing to have adequate information security 
policies and procedures) and Hotels and Resorts (for permitting vulnerable computers to access 
its network).  Thus, the data security failures that Wyndham attributes to the “Wyndham-branded 
hotels” are actually data security failures on Wyndham’s own network. 
Because all of the alleged data security failures in the Complaint are attributable to 
Wyndham, the FTC does not need to plead “actual control” over the activities of the Wyndham-
branded hotels, as Wyndham and its amici assert.  Wyndham Mot. 25-27; IFA Br. 6-8.  
Nevertheless, the Complaint does plead “actual control,” over the relevant aspects of the 
franchisees’ data security practices:  Wyndham required purchase of a particular property 
management system (id. ¶ 15); managed the systems (id. at ¶ 17); at some hotels, had exclusive 
access to the systems (id. ¶ 18); at all hotels, had administrator access to the systems (id. ¶ 17); 
set passwords for the systems (id.); and provided exclusive technical support for the systems (id. 
¶ 19).  These facts establish the “control or right to control” necessary to establish franchisor 
liability and, to the extent Wyndham intends to dispute these facts, that is a question of fact 
inappropriate for a motion to dismiss.  See Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, Inc., 582 F.2d 
781, 789-90 (3d Cir. 1978) (denying motion for summary judgment because further factual 
development was needed).11  Furthermore, the allegations that Wyndham concedes are relevant 
to the data security measures of the Wyndham entities, regarding failure to inventory computers 
(id. ¶ 24(g)), detection of unauthorized access (id. ¶ 24(h)), and incident response procedures (id. 
¶ 24(i)), are sufficient to state a claim for deceptive data security practices. 
                                                 
11  IFA also threatens that the “FTC’s theory would turn franchise law on its head.”  IFA Br. 10.  
This concern is meritless.  The actual-control exception is a well-established principle of 
franchise law.  See Drexel, 582 F.2d at 785-90. 
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Finally, Wyndham incorrectly claims that a reasonable consumer’s understanding of 
Wyndham’s privacy policy is a question of law that can be answered because the privacy policy, 
“by its plain terms,” disclaims responsibility for data security at the franchisees.  Wyndham Mot. 
25.  The Third Circuit has rejected such a “plain terms” approach to evaluating allegedly 
deceptive statements.  Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 695 F.2d 681, 687 (3d Cir. 1982) (“The 
impression created by the advertising, not its literal truth or falsity, is the desideratum.”).   
The FTC alleges that any reasonable consumer would have understood Wyndham’s 
privacy policy to be making express representations about information collected at the 
Wyndham-branded hotels.  Compl. ¶ 21.  For example, the policy states that it applies to “hotels 
of our brand” and “information collected about guests.”  See Wyndham Hotel Group, LLC 
Customer Privacy Policy and Information Practices Statement (“Wyndham Privacy Policy”), 
Hradil Decl., Ex. A, ECF No. 91-3, at 1.  Wyndham’s argument demands that this Court hold, as 
a matter of law and with no fact-finding, that “any reasonable consumer . . . would have 
understood that the policy made statements only about data-security practices at Hotels and 
Resorts and made no representations about data-security practices at the Wyndham-branded 
hotels.”  Wyndham Mot. 25-26. 12  Wyndham’s argument is premised entirely on one ambiguous 
disclaimer that comes five pages after language that suggests precisely the opposite:  That 
Wyndham’s data security representations cover information collected from hotel “guests” at 
“hotels of our brand.”  Even if there were an express statement disclaiming these security 
                                                 
12  Wyndham also argues that their privacy policy applies only to information Hotels and Resorts 
collects.  This contradicts the language of the privacy policy, which makes representations about 
information that Hotels and Resorts controls.  Wyndham Privacy Policy at 1.  This language 
suggests that the privacy policy would cover information collected at Wyndham-branded hotels 
but later controlled by a Wyndham entity.  Moreover, Wyndham certainly is responsible for the 
collection and control of information at hotels that it manages through Hotel Management.  See 
Compl. ¶ 10 (“fully operate”); id. ¶ 18 (“controls the ‘operation” of those hotels”). 
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representations, the effectiveness of such a disclaimer is a fact-specific inquiry and, as such, 
inappropriate for a motion to dismiss.  See FTC v. Nat’l Urological Group, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 
1167, 1189 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (“claims or net impressions communicated to reasonable consumers, 
is fundamentally a question of fact”).  Therefore, it is not appropriate to inquire at the motion to 
dismiss stage about the effectiveness of the disclaimer Wyndham identifies (in a paragraph that 
does not mention data security) on the bottom of the fourth page (of five pages) of the privacy 
policy. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the FTC respectfully requests that the Court deny Wyndham’s 
motion to dismiss.  
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